



















It is a well-known fact that the Barcelona
process cannot be accurately described
as being based on interdependent rela-
tionships between the partners involved,
owing to the resilience of asymmetric
patterns of development between the
North and the South of the Mediterra-
nean. Actually, few years ago, the Euro-
pean Commission1 itself stressed that,
despite enhanced economic openness
in Mediterranean non-member countries
(MNCs), substantial progress was still
needed in such fields as economic and
social reforms, economic liberalization,
privatisation, respect for human rights
and democratisation.2
Nonetheless, despite the resilience of
such asymmetric relations, the externa-
lisation of EU migration and asylum
issues,3 together with the explicit des-
ire of the EU to intensify its cooperation
on migration management with third
countries, have led to the emergence of
new forms of interconnectedness bet-
ween the European Union (EU) and some
MNCs, in the context of the joint mana-
gement of migration flows and border
controls.
With reference to the main developments
that occurred from 2003 onwards, the
purpose of this study lies in analysing
the various factors which have contribu-
ted to shaping the aforementioned inter-
connectedness, on the one hand, and
in explaining the reasons for which some
MNCs have been responsive to the joint
management of migration flows, on the
other.
The Ad Hoc Approach to
Cooperation in Migration and
Border Management
When Greece and Italy took up the EU
Presidency, respectively during the first
and second semesters of 2003, both
European countries undertook to imple-
ment most of the initiatives that were
already introduced in the wake of the
June 2002 Seville European Council. In
fact, the Greek presidency presented in
May 2003 a road-map4 which reasser-
ted the need to intensify cooperation in
the management of asylum and migra-
tion flows with third countries, including
the conclusion of readmission agree-
ments, the cooperation in the effective
management of the external borders of
EU Member States, the formal establis-
hment of Immigration Liaison Officers’
(ILOs) networks in third countries and
the implementation of effective return
policies in cooperation with third coun-
tries.
The June 2003 Thessaloniki European
Council fully reflected these priorities.
Moreover, it also emphasised “the impor-
tance of developing an evaluation mecha-
nism to monitor relations with third coun-
tries which do not cooperate with the
EU in combating illegal immigration.”5
This monitoring mechanism draws exten-
sively on the principles of “differentia-
tion” and “progressivity” that were pre-
sented in a previous communication from
the Commission to the Council in March
2003, introducing the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP).6 It is part and
parcel of the EU cross-pillar approach
to migration linking financial aid and deve-
lopment assistance with the actual adop-
tion, on the part of third countries’govern-
ments, of policies aimed at curbing illegal
migration. Furthermore, with regard to
Mediterranean third countries, the new
1 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament to pre-
pare the Fourth Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers “Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process,” COM (2000) 497 Final, Brussels,
6.9.2000.
2 Cassarino J.-P., Europe’s Migration Policy in the Mediterranean: An Overview, CARIM/RSCAS, Florence, 2004. 
www.carim.org/Publications/SOC200401cassarino.asp
3 Boswell C., “The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy,” International Affairs 79 (3), 2003, p. 619-638.
4 Council of the European Union, Road-Map for the Follow-up to the Conclusions of the European Council in Seville, 6023/04/03, Brussels, 5
May 2003.
5 Council of the European Union, Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, 11638/03, Brussels, 1 October
2003, p. 5.
6 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,
“Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,” COM (2003) 104 Final, Brussels,
11.3.2003.
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neighbourhood policies illustrate the des-
ire of the EU and its Member States to
reframe the patterns of partnerships alre-
ady existing in the EMP, while offering
“credible incentives,” as stated in the
December 2003 Euro-Mediterranean
Conference,7 to further implement eco-
nomic and political reforms and to co-
operate in the field of justice and home
affairs, particularly border controls, legal
and illegal migration, police cooperation
and the fight against human-trafficking.
Importantly, the ENP reflects not only the
prominence of asylum and migration
issues in the EU’s external relations with
third countries, but also the EU’s desire
to broaden the comprehensiveness of
its approach to migration and asylum by
giving third countries’governments incen-
tives :
• to fully comply with the 1951 Geneva
Convention on refugee protection;
• to effectively implement readmission
agreements;
• to cooperate in the control of the EU
external borders;
• to adopt provisions aimed at tackling
illegal migration and human-trafficking.
As far as Mediterranean non-member
countries (MNCs) are concerned, the
rationale is not to include them in the
minimum common list of safe countries
of origin that was presented in March
2004, as part of the draft EU asylum pro-
cedures directive. Actually, none of the
MNCs would currently qualify in a cre-
dible manner for the basic criteria con-
tained in the notion related to safe third
countries of origin.8
Rather, the issue at stake is to find short-
term solutions aimed at turning the man-
agement of migration flows (whether
legal or illegal), including the reinforced
control of the EU external borders, into
a growing shared priority among the part-
ners involved in the reframed Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. It also lies in
assessing the willingness of some MNCs
to participate in the migration manage-
ment programme “in a spirit of shared
responsibility.”
The Hague multi-annual Programme,
adopted at the November 2004 Brussels
European Council,9 following the com-
pletion of the five-year Tampere Program-
me, constituted a decisive step in stres-
sing the external dimension of asylum
and migration issues, and consequently
in acknowledging the need for rein-
forced cooperation with transit and origin
countries, in the fields of border man-
agement, the fight against illegal migra-
tion and human-trafficking, police co-
operation, readmission programmes and
refugee protection. Given the centrality
of justice and home affairs matters, this
reinforced framework of cooperation in
migration management could not but be
predominantly security-oriented, at least
in the short term. This orientation be-
came explicit in the three-to-five year
action plans which were presented by
the Commission in December 2004,
particularly in those related to Morocco
and Tunisia.10
By stressing that “asylum and migra-
tion are by their very nature internatio-
nal issues,”11 the EU acknowledges
that the credibility and effectiveness of
its common asylum and migration policy
is also dependent on the participation
of origin and transit countries in the
joint management of migration flows.
In other words, the growing externali-
sation of the EU migration and asylum
policy has been gradually conducive
to the emergence of unprecedented
forms of interconnectedness between
the EU and MNCs, while turning some
of them into strategic partners. In this
respect, Morocco and Tunisia are a
case in point.
MNCs’ Policy Responses to
Migration and Border
Management
To understand the factors which moti-
vated some MNCs to participate in the
joint management of migration flows, it
is important to break away from the taken-
for-granted vision that their participation
has been dictated by pressures exerted
by the EU and its Member States. In fact,
this assumption is based on a cause-
and-effect relationship that does not pro-
perly reflect the reasons and magnitude
of their responsiveness. Also, this
assumption tends to overlook the fact
that many MNCs have for long been con-
cerned by the need for migration man-
agement and policy response to illegal
and human-trafficking. In fact, as early
as the 1990s, most of them participa-
ted in the numerous consultative meet-
ings on migration management, which
were organised by various intergovern-
mental organisations, such as the minis-
terial conferences held in Rabat (October
2003) and in Algiers (September 2004)
in the framework of the 5+5 dialogue on
migration in the Western Mediterranean.
Since 2003, the participation of some
MNCs in these consultative meetings,
together with the adoption of measures
and provisions aimed at fighting against
illegal migration and human-trafficking,
have turned them into credible players
in migration talks.
Indeed, in the field of illegal migration,
Morocco adopted in 2003 restrictive legal
provisions aimed at dealing with the pre-
sence of foreigners and illegal migrants
on its territory. These provisions included
not only the enactment of law 02-03,12
7 Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Presidency Conclusions, 2-3 December 2003.
8 These criteria are based, amongst others, on the rule of law, the respect of human rights and democracy. See Council of the European Union,
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status,
12888/1/03, Brussels, 30 September 2003, p. 9.
9 See Annex 1 in Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, 4/5 November 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 14292/04, Brussels,
5 November 2004.
10 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the European Commission to the Council, “On the Commission Proposals
for Action Plans Under the European Neighbourhood Policy,” COM (2004) 795 Final, Brussels, 9.12.2004.
11 Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, 4/5 November 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 14292/04, Brussels, 5 November
2004, p. 20.
12 Law 02-03 was adopted by the Moroccan Parliament and published in the Bulletin Officiel on November 13th 2003. This law contains arti-
cles regarding the release of residence permits (Chapter 2), the duration of stay in the Kingdom, the mobility of the foreigner in the Kingdom
but also the creation of two institutions
aimed at controlling borders, at fighting
against migrant-trafficking and at defi-
ning a national strategy in the field of
migration management.13 The adoption
of these provisions was positively viewed
by the US Department of State which
mentioned in its 2004 annual report on
human-trafficking that Morocco “fully
complies with the minimum standards [of
the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act]
for the elimination of trafficking.”14
Concomitantly, the government of Tunisia
responded to the management of migra-
tion flows, by adopting in February 2004
Law 2004-6 on passports and travel
documents.15 Chapter IV of Law 2004-
6 contains 55 articles related to the entry
and exit of citizens and non-citizens. It
makes provisions for severe sanctions
against whoever (citizens, foreigners,
carriers, organisations) facilitates the ille-
gal crossing of the border. Article 50 also
provides for the expulsion from Tunisia
of the convicted foreigner, “once the sen-
tence is served.” The adoption of law
2004-6 raised many criticisms among
human rights organisations,16 not so much
because of the severe sanctions contai-
ned in it as because it tends to exces-
sively criminalize migrants, including those
trying to use Tunisia as a country of tran-
sit, and also because it includes admi-
nistrative and judicial restrictions that dis-
regard migrants’ human rights.
Law 2004-6 draws extensively on the
Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supple-
menting the United Nations Convention
against Trans-national Organized Crime,
which was adopted in November 2000
and which entered into force in January
2004. The government of Tunisia rati-
fied this protocol in November 2003.
The ratification constituted a way of sho-
wing that the government of Tunisia was
intent on giving itself the adequate legal
means with a view to countering the ille-
gal migration of Tunisian citizens and of
foreign migrants in transit through Tunisia.
It also constituted a way of showing that
Tunisia could act as a credible player in
the joint management of migration flows.
The need for enhanced credibility, in this
specific field, became all the more cru-
cial for the government of Tunisia as the
national and international media repor-
ted, in June 2003, the death of over 200
people, trying to cross illegally the straits
of Sicily, on board of a trawler which cap-
sized off the coast of Sfax. A political
response was hence needed.
Interconnectedness and Stronger
Leverage
The adoption of drastic measures aimed
at curtailing illegal migration and fighting
against the smuggling of migrants, were
not the only steps that the government
of Tunisia and the government of Mo-
rocco undertook to play the efficiency
card and to enhance their international
credibility in the management of migra-
tion.
In fact, unprecedented bilateral agree-
ments on sea border controls materia-
lised in January 2004 between Tunisia
and Italy, in the framework of the Neptune
project,17 and in December 2003 bet-
ween Morocco and Spain.18 As a result
of the bilateral agreement on migrant-
trafficking signed between Morocco and
Spain, a substantial financial protocol,
amounting to 390 million Euros, was sig-
ned in Marrakech between Spain and
Morocco in December 2003, with a view
to supporting the delocalisation of
Spanish firms to the Moroccan market
in various sectors of industry.19 In January
2004, Italy followed suit and rewarded
the involvement of Tunisia in the Neptune
project by sustaining Italian FDIs to
Tunisia, for a global amount of 36.5 million
Euros.
Importantly, the search for enhanced cre-
dibility cannot exclusively account for the
participation of Morocco and Tunisia in
the global migration management agen-
da. The terrorist outrages that severely
hit Tunisia and Morocco in 2002 and
2003, may also constitute explanatory
factors of the above-mentioned patterns















(Chapter 7), the conditions under which a foreigner may be expelled from the national territory (Chapters 3, 4 & 5), the detention of illegal
migrants in “waiting zones” (Chapter 6), sanctions against over-stayers and illegal migrants (Chapter 8) and against migrant-smugglers or any
moral or physical entity involved in the illegal entry of migrants in the Kingdom (from art. 50 to art. 56). See Belguendouz, A., Le Maroc non afri-
cain gendarme de l’Europe?, Imprimerie Beni Snassen, Salé, 2003, p. 81-112.
13 In fact, following a ministerial meeting presided over by King Mohammed VI on November 10th 2003, two institutions were created. Firstly, the
Direction de la migration et de la surveillance du territoire mobilises the Ministry of Interior, as well as the national gendarmerie, the army and the
marine. Secondly, the observatoire de la migration, whose major mission consists in elaborating a statistical database on migration flows, is
expected to propose to the Moroccan public authorities, concrete actions to be taken in the field of migration management. See Maroc Hebdo
International n. 580, 14-20 November 2003, p. 8.
14 US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2004, Washington, 2004, p. 199.
15 Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, Loi organique n° 2004-6 du 3 février 2004, modifiant et complétant la loi n° 75-40 de 1975, rela-
tive aux passeports et aux documents de voyage, n°11, 6 février 2004, p. 252 et suiv.
16 Boubakri H., “Transit Migration between Tunisia, Libya, and Sub-Saharan Africa: Study based on Greater Tunis.” Regional Conference on
“Migrants in Transit Countries: Sharing Responsibility for Management and Protection,” Council of Europe, 2004, p. 23.
www.coe.int/T/F/Coh%E9sion_sociale/Migrations/MG-RCONF_2004_%206e%20-%20Report%20by%20Boubakri.pdf
17 The Neptune project is a joint operation aimed at strengthening controls at the sea borders of the EU, in the Mediterranean. This project was
introduced by Italian Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu under the 2003 Italian Presidency of the EU and was initiated on September 10th 2003.
Since then, the Neptune project has been backed by Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Malta, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Spain and
Europol. A joint centre of surveillance was established in Palermo with a view to preventing and acting quickly against illegal migration and human-
trafficking in the Mediterranean.
18 The agreement was signed on December 4th 2003 between Spain and Morocco. It is aimed at fighting against human-trafficking through joint
sea border police cooperation in the area surrounding the Canary Islands and in the straits of Gibraltar. See the Moroccan weekly Maroc Hebdo
International n. 584, 12-18 December 2003, p. 6.
19 This amount was undoubtedly the most important ever granted to Morocco from Spain. It was expected to stimulate Spanish foreign direct inves-
tments (FDIs) to Morocco and to turn Spain into Morocco’s major investor. See Maroc Hebdo International n. 584, 12-18 December 2003, p. 6.
management. These factors have gene-
rated links of interconnectedness in the
field of security and border controls.
Additionally, a direct consequence of
these reinforced links of interconnected-
ness lies not only in the possibility for
the government of Tunisia and the go-
vernment of Morocco to capitalise on
their participation in the joint manage-
ment of migration flows and border con-
trols, but also in their ability to exert more
leverage on the enlarged EU, in terms of
financial aid and development assistan-
ce. There is no question that, since 2003,
this leverage has become a strategic
issue for both North African countries
whose expectations have been made
more explicit on the international arena.
In fact, during the 15th symposium of
the Tunisian ruling party, the Rassem-
blement Constitutionnel Démocratique
(RCD), which took place in November
2003, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
was keen to recall that the security con-
cerns of the EU regarding migration flows
should not conceal the fact that such
flows are “the direct consequence of the
economic changes with which Southern
countries are being faced in their deve-
lopment process and in the context of
their [economic] openness to the
North.”20 Similarly, on the occasion of
the first Summit of the Heads of State
and Government of the Western Medite-
rranean Basin, which was held under the
auspices of the government of Tunisia,
in December 2003, a common declara-
tion was issued stressing “the importan-
ce of seeing the European Union accom-
pany its enlargement process [i.e. Wider
Europe] by similar supportive efforts
towards the countries of the South-West
Mediterranean [...].”21 In the same vein,
Nezha Chekrouni, Minister Delegate in
charge of the Moroccan émigré commu-
nity abroad, underlined that Morocco’s
involvement in the fight against illegal
migration is contingent on the “great res-
ponsibility of the EU to support [Mo-
rocco’s] development efforts.”22
The case studies of Morocco and Tunisia
are important to show that the growing
externalisation of the EU migration and
asylum policies, as well as the reinfor-
ced control of its external borders in coo-
peration with some MNCs, has led to
the emergence of unprecedented forms
of interconnectedness between the north
and the south of the Mediterranean, in
the fields of security and border con-
trols. Concomitantly, the two case stu-
dies have also demonstrated that such
forms of interconnectedness have allo-
wed the government of Tunisia and the
government of Morocco to exert more
leverage on the EU and its Member
States, in terms of development assis-
tance and financial aid. In other words,
this means that the two North African
countries are intent on responding pro-
actively to the externalisation of the EU’s
migration and asylum policies and to
capitalise on the convergence of their
security concerns with those of their
Northern Mediterranean neighbours.
Finally, although this interconnected-
ness is becoming the dominant char-
acter of today’s joint management of
international migration in the Euro-
Mediterranean area, it is important to
stress that this framework of coopera-
tion has its own limits. These limits
shape in turn the policy options and the
degree of responsiveness to the joint
management of migration flows on the
part of MNCs. To give an example, the
proposal made by Germany and Italy,
during the October 2004 G5 meeting
in Florence, to create centres in North
Africa aimed at processing asylum-see-
20 Réalités, “15ème Symposium international du RCD: Vers une solidarité euro-méditerranéenne,” n. 6 November 2003.
21 The text of the Declaration of Tunis is accessible at www.5plus5.tn
22 Maroc Hebdo International, “Nous en appelons à l’Europe,” n. 582, 28 November-4 December. 2003, p. 11.
According to the OECD, in the period 2002-
2003 it was observed that after various years
of continuous growth, international migration
to OECD countries stabilised. However, this
cannot be seen as the start of a stabilisation
of immigration flows, since there were other
relevant factors (the fight against international
terrorism, the war in Iraq and the SARS epi-
demy) and a slow economic recovery, espe-
cially in the Eurozone countries, which could
have contributed to slow down these migra-
tion flows.
However, we must not forget that there are
structural factors in the OECD countries, such
as an ageing population, the need for labour
(especially qualified labour) and the importan-
ce of family reunification, which continue to
influence migration flows.
Even though the general trend is for the stabi-
lisation of migration dynamics into EU coun-
tries, updated data enable us to observe the
dynamic of the flows to EU countries over the
period 1990-2002, and we can differentiate
between three groups of countries: those in
which numbers are declining (amongst which
Belgium and France stand out), those expe-
riencing sustained growth (like Austria and
Germany) and those experiencing an accele-
ration in immigration (Greece, Portugal, Italy
and Spain), these last two countries having an
important Mediterranean component in the
immigration flows.
This fact might be an indication of a possible
reorientation of the flows coming from the Sou-
thern Mediterranean towards the EU, with a
reduction of migration into countries which have
traditionally received migration flows from the
Mediterranean. Thus, although in 1997 immi-
gration from Third Mediterranean Countries
was almost a third of the total immigration figu-
re, in 2002 this percentage fell to 23.6%. In
2004 data, this percentage fell to 20.6% and
this trend may continue with the enlargement
of the EU to 25 countries, since from enlarged
EU data immigration from Third Mediterranean
Countries stands at 18%.
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kers’ claims en route to the EU, was
vehemently rejected by all the govern-
ments of North Africa. This negative
response reflected the threshold beyond
which the joint management of migra-
tion flows cannot prosper. It also allo-
wed some MNCs, including Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, to voice that
the credibility of the joint management
of migration flows in the Euro-Medi-
terranean area will also depend on the
enlarged EU’s commitment to suppor-
ting their economic challenges by the
introduction of accompanying measu-
res.
So far, the interconnectedness has been
predominantly founded on the conver-
gence of short-term security concerns
and on few concrete actions aimed at
alleviating poverty, promoting institutio-
nal reforms and sustaining economic
development in origin and transit coun-
tries, i.e., the actual root causes of migra-
tion. Unfortunately, the November 2004
Hague Programme did not consistently
address these resilient root causes. As
a matter of fact, in the near future, the
EU will need to find additional innova-
tive solutions and incentives to address
these long-term issues. These solutions
are all the more essential as it has now
become clear that some MNCs intend
to capitalise on their empowered posi-
tion and leverage to make the joint
management of migration in the Euro-
Mediterranean area more responsive to
their economic and developmental
needs.
